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Abstract
A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-
minimal winning coalitions can form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are
presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a
refinement of Nash equilibrium. In particular, the data support the prediction that non-minimal
winning coalitions occur when the distance between policy positions of the parties is small
relative to the value of forming the government. These conditions hold in games 1, 3, 4 and 5,
where subjects played their unique potential-maximizing strategies 91, 52, 82 and 84 percent of
the time, respectively. In the remaining game (Game 2) experimental data support the prediction
of a minimal winning coalition. Players A and B played their unique potential-maximizing
strategies 84 and 86 percent of the time, respectively, and the predicted minimal-winning
government formed 92 percent of the time (all strategy choices for player C conform with
potential maximization in Game 2). In Games 1, 2, 4 and 5 over 98 percent of the observed Nash
equilibrium outcomes were those predicted by potential maximization. Other solution concepts
including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and strong/coalition proof Nash
equilibrium are also tested.
Keywords: Coalition formation; potential maximization; Nash equilibrium refinements;
experimental study; minimal winning.
JEL Classification: C72, C78, D72
1. Introduction
This paper applies recent theoretical advances in the theory of potential games to coalition
formation, derives predictions, and tests them experimentally. Our goal is to ascertain to what
extent potential maximization (a refinement of Nash equilibrium) is a useful guide in predicting
coalition formation behavior. We consider three-player games. This is the simplest setting in
which interesting coalitional structures can emerge. Moreover, the theoretical predictions for the
three-player case are unambiguous and reduce to few enough cases that exhaustive experimental
testing is feasible.
The framing of our study is coalition government formation. This provides concreteness
when discussing aspects of the coalition formation process and gives a context to the
experimental subjects. The model we consider is highly stylized but it captures fundamental
aspects that apply to government formation and other applications (e.g., corporate merges,
cartels). Namely, increasing the size of the government beyond the minimum requirement
increases the need to compromise and reduces the surplus to being in power; different members
of coalitions have more power than others and hence extract more surplus; decisions made in the
coalition formation process affect payoffs of winning members.
Players are political parties that are differentiated by exogenously given policy positions.
Policy positions are points on the real line. This is not essential, as the theory could be redone
using the Euclidean distance between points in multiple dimensions. Assuming a one-
dimensional policy space is convenient because it allows us to classify predictions for all three-
player games in terms of just two distances. This reduces the number of cases to test
experimentally and is appropriate for the purpose at hand.
The game begins after the election is over. To avoid trivial cases, it is assumed that no
party controls a majority of the votes, and hence any two parties (or all three) control a majority.
The coalition that forms the government is the one controlling a majority of the votes cast. The
members of the government are entitled to share a surplus, which is interpreted as the value of
forming the government. The amount of the surplus depends on the policy positions of the
government members and the policy choice of the government. Assuming distinct policy
positions, adding more parties to a coalition government lowers the value of forming the
government as a greater deal of compromising is required to accommodate a wider spectrum of
beliefs. The technical implication is that the characteristic function of the coalitional game is not
superadditive.
The surplus of the coalition government is divided according to the Myerson value
(Myerson, 1977). The Myerson value is a generalization of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
that reflects the cooperation (or link) structure within each coalition (see also Aumann &
Myerson, 1988). If all the members of a coalition are linked, the Myerson value is the same as
the Shapley value; otherwise, a bigger payoff is given to players that hold special positions in the
link structure.
The attachment of more weight to players with a special position in the link structure
makes sense in this context if links are interpreted as representing favorable, bilateral
relationships between the parties. In the model, two players are linked if and only if each of them
independently expresses a desire to cooperate with the other. It is likely that such players will
work together toward mutually beneficial outcomes in the political process. The absence of a
link between two players means that at least one player excludes the other in her proposal for the
coalition government. It is easy to imagine that there will be sore feelings between unlinked
players and that such players will draw less benefit from being in the government. Hence, it is
natural to assign less weight to players with missing links.
By using the proposed method of dividing the surplus, the government formation game is
a potential game, as defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996). A useful fact about potential
games is that only a subset of the Nash equilibria of potential games coincides with the set of
strategy profiles that maximize the potential. This renders potential maximization useful as a
refinement tool.
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In the theoretical part of this study, we describe the predictions of potential maximization
and a variety of applicable solution concepts. Only two of the possible cooperation structures
survive potential maximization, and generically the cooperation structure selected by potential
maximization is unique: the possibilities are either a two-party government or a three-party
government with full cooperation (i.e., every pair of players is linked in the cooperation
structure). We provide conditions for either type of government. These are expressed in terms of
the size of the government surplus and the distances between parties on the policy line.
In the empirical part of this study, potential maximization is competitively tested against
other solution concepts including iterated elimination of dominated strategies and
strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium. The data comes from a collection of experiments
conducted using student subjects at the University of Arizona. The theory neatly divides the
parameter space into three categories. We tested five games that were based on parameter
selections from each one (including three selections from one category to test the importance of
symmetry.)  We find potential maximization outperforms other refinements of Nash equilibrium
in predicting individual behavior and outcomes.
                                                          
1 See Monderer and Shapley 1996, Section 5.
Experimental studies of coalition formation have a long history in the social sciences.
Some of the early experiments were conducted by political scientists (Laing & Morrison, 1973;
Riker, 1971, 1972), psychologists (Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957),
sociologists (Gamson, 1961, 1964), economists (Murnighan & Roth, 1977, 1978), and game
theoreticians (Kalisch et al., 1954: Maschler, 1965). Many of the early studies focused on
psychological aspects of coalition formation behavior, whereas others (e.g., Kalisch et al., 1954;
Maschler, 1965) were designed to test theoretical predictions of coalition formation modeled as
games in characteristic function form (see Kahan & Rapoport, 1984, for a review of this early
experimental literature).
We follow the later studies by focusing on games that are both nonzero sum and non-
superadditive. The nonzero-sum assumption is in accordance with Riker (1967) who states “the
greater portion of political activity in forming coalitions is nonzero sum in the sense that
different minimal winning coalitions win different amounts and the loss to the loser may not
equal the gain to the winner.” Our focus on non-superadditive games reflects the idea mentioned
above that adding new members to an already winning coalition might decrease the value of the
coalition. Unlike Riker and Maschler, we do not assume that adding a new member to a winning
coalition depreciates its value to zero.  Instead, we assign the grand coalition (which is the only
non minimal winning coalition in our design) a positive value. This allows for the selection of
non-minimal winning coalitions in our model; a feature that is borne out in the experimental
results reported below.
2.  Model
Consider a parliamentary system with three parties, where each party has an exogenously given
policy position represented by a point on the real line. The policy position of each party iÎ N
={A,B,C} is denoted piÎÂ, where pA £ p B £ p C. Let p=(pA, pB, pC) denote a vector of policy
positions. Each party controls a number of seats that it won in an election. Seat shares are
assumed to be such that any two parties (or all three parties) can combine to control a majority of
the seats, but no single party has a majority. There is a surplus of G that is received by the
members of whichever coalition government forms. However, this surplus is reduced by an
amount determined by the distances between the policy positions of the coalition government
members and the position, y, chosen by the government. Specifically, given p and G, the value to
any coalition S is given by the characteristic function v( × ;p,G) where
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The characteristic function specified in (1) is the same as that used in Austin-Smith and Banks
(1988). We use it to define a government formation game in which parties A, B, and C are the
players. We restrict attention to parameter values for which v(S;p,G) > 0 whenever  2 ³ S . This
ensures that there is always some positive value to being able to form the government.
The strategy set of player i is denoted by  }. \ { i N S i Í = P  The empty set is included in
i P . A strategy  i i P Î p  is a set of parties with whom player i wishes to cooperate with and form
a government. For instance, the strategy set of player A is  { = P A Æ, B, C, {B,C}}, signifying that
player A can choose to cooperate with nobody, party B, party C, or both parties B and C. Let
. i N i P ´ = P Î  Each strategy profile  P Î = ) , , ( C B A p p p p  determines a cooperation (link)
structure  g(p) in the following way. Given p Î P, a link between parties i and j forms if and only
if the desire to cooperate is mutual, i.e., if and only if  j i p Î  and  i j p Î . Denote an undirected
bilateral link between parties i and j by  j i :.  T h e n   }. : { ) ( j i j and i j i g p p p Î Î =  All
parties that are linked (directly or indirectly) in the cooperation structure that results from some
strategy profile played in the government formation game will form the coalition government.
Payoffs to each player under a given strategy profile are determined by the Myerson
value. The Myerson values for players depend upon the characteristic function v( × ;p,G) and the
cooperation structure they form. Given a strategy profile p, and a coalition  N S Í , let  ) ( / p g S
denote the partition of S into subsets of players who are connected (directly or indirectly) by g(p)
in S. To calculate the Myerson value, let v
g(p)(  × ;p,G) denote the characteristic function
determined according to
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g p  reflects the fact that coalition S may not be able to form due to a lack of
connectedness among all the members of S. We denote the Myerson value of the coalitional
game (v
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is the Shapley value for player i in the game (v
g(p)( × ;p,G), N). In summary, the government
formation game consists of players’ strategy sets PA, PB, and PC, and their payoff functions
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3.  Theoretical Predictions
A variety of solution concepts apply to the government formation game.
2 We consider Nash
equilibrium and some of its refinements. Because of the way payoffs are defined the government
formation game is a potential game (see Qin 1996). Hence, one refinement that we consider is
potential maximization. This refinement involves finding the set of strategy profiles for the game
that maximizes the potential of the game. This set of strategy profiles is meaningful because it
always constitutes a subset of the Nash equilibria for the game. Moreover, the potential has the
property that its value increases with beneficial unilateral deviations by the players. Hence,
individual actions taken to improve own welfare lead to higher values of the potential.
 3
Potential maximization is a particularly effective refinement in this game, because it
always yields a unique prediction of the cooperation structure (and payoffs) that results from
play of the game. We also examine strong Nash equilibria (SNE), Coalition proof Nash
equilibria (CPNE), and solutions resulting from iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies (IEWDS). SNE and CPNE are less desirable as refinements since they may not be
unique and may not exist. Nevertheless, the comparisons are instructive.
                                                          
2 See Van den Nouweland (2003) for more on the refinements we discuss below.
3.1 Nash equilibria in weakly dominant strategies
The first result identifies parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy
to cooperate with the other two parties. The result is followed by a corollary that identifies the
parameter set for which full cooperation emerges as a Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant
strategies.
Proposition 1. Party A has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties B and C if
and only if  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
Party B has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties A and C if and only if
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B B A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B B A
C y
Party C has a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with parties A and B if and only if
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y  and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
See Appendix A for proof. Four of the six individual conditions obtained from applying
Proposition 1 to each of the three parties are redundant. Hence, to check that all three parties
have a dominant strategy to cooperate fully it is sufficient to check only two conditions.
Corollary 1. All three parties have a (weakly) dominant strategy to cooperate with both of the
other parties if  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y and  . 0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y
                                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Further justification of potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium is provided in Garratt and Qin
(2003b).
Graphical representation: The characteristic function v( × ;p,G) specified in (1) is invariant to
translations of the party positions. In other words, the relative policy positions of the parties
matter, whereas the absolute policy positions do not. For this reason, and because we assume pA
£ p B £ p C, the three parameters pA, pB, and pC can be replaced with two distance parameters
A B p p d - = 1  and  . 2 B C p p d - =  Fix G. The conditions  0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C B C A
A y   and
0 ) , (
} : , : { ³ G p
C A B A
C y  describe a rotated hyperbola in (d1, d2) space. The intersection of the two
graphs in 
2
+ Â  defines the set of parameter values for which every party has a dominant strategy
to cooperate with both of the other parties (See Fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Dominant strategies, potential maximization, and the five games.
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3.2 Potential maximization
We adapt the definition of potential from Monderer and Shapley (1996). A potential for a
government formation game (with parameter values  ) ,G p  is a function  Â ® P : P such that for
any i Î N, p Î P, and  ,
’
i i P Î p  ). , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
’ ) ( ) , (
’
i i i i
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The predictions of potential maximization are described below.
Proposition 2. A three-party government with complete cooperation will maximize the potential
if and only if fA(v( × ;p,G)) ³ 0 and fC(v( × ;p,G)) ³ 0.  The two-party government {A,B}
(respectively {B,C}) will maximize the potential if and only if fA(v( × ;p,G)) £ 0 (respectively
fC(v( × ;p,G)) £ 0.
Proof is in Appendix A.
Graphical representation: Fix G. Then each of the conditions fA(v(× ;p,G)) = 0 and fC(v(× ; p,G))
= 0 describe a rotated ellipse in (d1,d2) space. The intersection of the two ellipses in 
2
+ Â  defines
the set of parameter values for which the potential maximizing outcome is full cooperation (See
Fig. 1).
The second statement in Proposition 2 is not surprising. It should be taken merely as an
indication of the reasonableness of the solution concept. At the same time, it is worth noting that
some well-known, sequential processes of coalition formation, such as the method described in
Austin-Smith and Banks (1988), do not have this property. Conversely, it is perhaps surprising
that the magnitude of G matters in determining whether the government will be two-party
(minimal winning) or three-party (non-minimal winning). This occurs because the Myerson
value averages marginal contributions that occur when a party enters a coalition that is already
winning with cases where the coalition is not already winning. Whenever a party joins a coalition
that is already winning, it reduces the surplus available to the coalition members. Whether or not
such instances are overridden by cases where the party is instrumental in causing a coalition to
be winning depends on the magnitude of G. The practical implication is that we expect larger
governments to be more prevalent in instances where the gains to being in power are large, and
the distances between policy positions are small.
4.  Treatment Parameters
We specified five games to be studied experimentally. The parameters selected for the five
games are shown graphically in Fig. 1. Games 1, 4, and 5 lie in the intersection of the set of
parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy to cooperate with the
other two parties and the set of parameter values for which the unique potential maximizing
strategy profile is complete cooperation. These games differ in terms of the degree of symmetry:
all three parties are seen to have the same party position in Game 1, only parties A and B are the
same in Game 4, and all three parties have different policy positions in Game 5. Game 2 lies in
the set of parameters for which potential maximization predicts a two-party coalition government
including parties A and B. Game 3 lies in the set of parameter values for which the unique
potential maximizing strategy profile is complete cooperation, but unlike games 1, 4, and 5, it
lies outside the set of parameter values for which each party has a weakly dominant strategy to
cooperate with the other two parties.
With three parties there are eight possible cooperation structures. Appendix B illustrates
the eight possible cooperation structures for each of these five games and the associated payoffs
for each of the three players. Numbers in parentheses in Appendix B indicate negative payoffs
(losses). Observe that in Games 1-4 the efficient, minimal winning government is the coalition
{A,B}, whereas in Game 5 it is the coalition {B,C}. Potential maximization predicts complete
cooperation (which is inefficient) in all but Game 2. Hence, in all but Game 2, the occurrence of
potential maximizing outcomes cannot be interpreted as a desire by subjects to maximize total
surplus.
4.1 Other solution concepts
We evaluate other solution concepts that apply to the games in Fig. 1 on a case-by-case basis.
These include SNE and CPNE, two well-known refinements of Nash equilibrium. CPNE is
defined recursively. As compared to SNE, there is an additional requirement that a deviation by a
coalition must be valid in the sense that no proper subcoalition would want to deviate from the
deviation. In this case, any proper subcoalition of a two-player coalition is a singleton. Thus, any
deviation by a two-player coalition is valid provided that deviation guarantees individual
rationality. In our games, single-player coalitions receive a payoff of zero and all two-player
coalitions yield positive payoffs for both players in the coalition (see Appendix B). Thus, SNE
and CPNE coincide for our games.
There are no strong or coalition proof Nash equilibria in Games 1, 4, and 5. All strategy
profiles in Game 2 that produce the cooperation structure A:B are both potential maximizing and
strong/coalition-proof. In Game 3, SNE/CPNE produces a subset of the Nash equilibria that does
not include the potential maximizing strategy profile: only Nash equilibrium strategy profiles
that pair parties A and B (without C) are both strong and coalition-proof.
In addition, we consider solutions obtained by IEWDS. The profile ({B,C},{A,C},{A,B})
is the sole survivor of IEWDS in Games 1, 4, and 5. It is one of the eight Nash equilibria of these
games. There are four strategy profiles in Game 2 that survive IEWDS, namely, (B,A,Æ),
(B,{A,C},Æ), ({B,C},A,Æ), and ({B,C},{A,C},Æ). Each of these four strategy profiles is a Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, each gives rise to the cooperation structure A:B, which yields the same
payoff of 270 to parties A and B (Fig. 2b). Party C cooperates with nobody in each of the strategy
profiles that survive IEWDS. There are eight strategy profiles in Game 3 that survive IEWDS.
Of these eight profiles, five are Nash equilibria; namely (B,A,Æ), (B,{A,C},Æ), ({B,C},A,Æ),
(B,A,{A,B}), and ({B,C},{A,C},{A,B}), and three are not; namely (B, {A,C}, {A,B}), ({B,C}, A,
{A,B}),  ({B,C}, {A,C}, Ø). Four of the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that survive IEWDS in
Game 3 give rise to the cooperation structure A:B (with symmetric payoffs to players A and B,
see Fig. 2c), and the fifth gives rise to the cooperation structure A:B,B:C,A:C.
5. Experiment
To competitively test the different solution concepts, we devised a computer-controlled
experiment with payoffs contingent on performance where groups of three players each played
repeatedly the five different games identified in Appendix B. Both player roles (party A, party B,
or party C) and group membership were varied from one period to another to prevent reputation
effects.  In what follows, we describe the experimental procedure and present the results. Each
game separately does not allow a competitive test of all the theoretical predictions, but the
aggregate of the five games does allow this test.
5.1 Method
Subjects. Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Arizona participated in the
experiment. The players participated in four separate sessions each consisting of 15 members. To
allow for generality of the results, we chose subjects with different levels of sophistication or
knowledge. Sessions 1 and 2 included inexperienced undergraduate students from the school of
Business and Public Administration who volunteered to take part in a decision making
experiment for monetary reward contingent on performance. Session 3 included undergraduate
students who had some familiarity with the basic notions of non-cooperative game theory and
considerable experience in playing computer-controlled strategic games. Session 4 included
graduate students who have taken at least one course on non-cooperative game theory. Payoffs
were stated in terms of a fictitious currency called “francs” that at the end of the session were
converted into US dollars at the rate $1.00 = 200 francs for Sessions 1, 3, and 4 and $1.00 = 125
francs for Session 2. In addition to their earnings in the experiment, players of Sessions 1 and 2
received a $5.00 show-up fee, whereas players of Sessions 3 and 4 received course credit in lieu
of the show-up fee. Total earnings for Sessions 1 through 4 were $235.00, $319.00, $311.00, and
$321.00, respectively.
Procedure. All the four sessions were conducted in the Economics Science Laboratory (ESL) at
the University of Arizona. At the beginning of each session, the players drew poker chips from a
bag to randomly determine their seat assignment. Players were individually seated in the ESL,
which consists of 40 networked computer workstations in separate cubicles. Each cubicle
contains a computer monitor, keyboard, mouse, paper and pencil, and a set of written
instructions.
4 When every player in the session completed reading the instructions, the supervisor
entertained a brief question and answer period to ensure that everyone understood the operation
of the computers, game design, and payoff function. Very few questions were asked. Five
different three-player games were then presented to the players. Each game was iterated either
three (Sessions 1 and 2) or six (Sessions 3 and 4) times. The order of presentation of the games
was randomized within five-trial blocks. The same ordering of the games was used in all four
sessions to facilitate comparison between them. On each trial, the fifteen subjects in each session
were divided into five groups of three players each. Both player role and group membership were
varied from trial to trial to prevent reputation effects and provide each player the same
opportunity to participate in all three roles. A between-subject randomized design was used to
assign the players to the three roles in the game. The same assignment schedule was used for
each session.
Prior to starting the experiment, all the players in a session completed a self-paced two-
part computerized test to ensure their understanding of the game. During the first part of this test,
players were presented with the eight possible cooperation structures. For each of their four
individual strategies they were asked to identify which cooperation structure could potentially
result, given that they did not know the strategies played by the other players. The purpose of the
first part of the test was to make it clear to each player that her individual outcome depended not
only on her decision, but also on the decisions of the two other players in her group. If a question
was answered incorrectly, the player was informed of this fact and then received the correct
answer. After a player completed the first part of the test, she immediately proceeded to the
second part.
                                                          
4 To view the instructions go to http://www.eller.arizona.edu/~map/research/
In the second part of the test each player was presented with scenarios identifying all
three of the players’ strategies, including their own. They were then asked to state which
cooperation structure would (necessarily) result from the combination of these strategies. Players
were shown a non-repeating sequence of scenarios and were required to provide three
consecutive correct responses. The experiment started once all the players in the session passed
the test satisfactorily.
The pre-experimental manipulation check served two purposes. The first was to ensure
that each player fully understood the government formation game and learned how to register his
or her responses. The second and equally important purpose was to ensure that complete
understanding of the game by all players in the session was common knowledge.
Because of delays incurred during the test and inexperience with strategic thinking,
players in Sessions 1 and 2 completed only 15 trials each. The more “sophisticated” players in
Sessions 3 and 4 successfully answered the test questions considerably faster, made their
decisions quicker, and subsequently succeeded in completing 30 trials in the two-hour session.
At the beginning of each trial, all the players in a session viewed the same screen
illustrating the eight possible cooperation structures and their associated payoffs.  Below the
diagram, a statement appeared identifying their player role for that trial. Additionally, the
relevant payoffs were individually highlighted for each player role by changing the color to a
bright green. To register a choice, a player had to ‘click’ on one of four computerized buttons
representing her four possible strategies. Once selected, a ‘commit’ button appeared for the
player to confirm her decision.  Players were allowed to change their strategy choices as often as
they wished without penalty or without revealing their decision to the two other members of their
group. Once all three players confirmed their decisions, they viewed an earnings summary that
graphically depicted the resulting cooperation structure and identified the individual payoffs.
Any form of communication during the experiment was strictly forbidden.
Players were only informed of the outcome of the group in which they participated.
Information about other groups in the session was not provided. Each player could review the
outcomes of all the previous trials in which she had actually participated. Once a player
completed reviewing her results, if she chose doing so, she exited the Results screen and waited
for all other players to complete the trial. When the last player in the session completed
reviewing the Results screen, the experiment advanced to the next trial, if it was not the last.
6.  Results
Previous experience in playing computerized games and “sophistication” had significant effects
on the outcomes. We found no significant difference (t=0.31, p<0.76) in the percentage of choice
of undominated strategies (summed across the 15 trials) between Sessions 1 and 2. Similarly, we
found no significant difference (t=1.61, p<0.12) in the percentage of choice of undominated
strategies (summed across 30 trials) between Sessions 3 and 4. However, the null hypothesis of
no effect for experience in playing computer-controlled games and sophistication in game theory
was rejected (t=2.70, p<0.009) when we compared the combined frequencies in Sessions 1 and 2
with the combined frequencies in Sessions 3 and 4. As might be expected, the subjects in
Sessions 3 and 4 chose undominated strategies significantly more often. Therefore, in many of
the analyses below we differentiate between the “unsophisticated” (Sessions 1 and 2) and
“sophisticated” (Sessions 3 and 4) groups.
We found no significant difference (t=1.70,  p<0.09) in the strategy choices or game
outcomes between trials 1-15 and 16-30 in Sessions 3 and 4. Therefore, the results were
combined across trials. With 15 trials in Sessions 1, we have a total of 225 strategy choices for
each of these two sessions. The number of strategy choices per session in Sessions 3 and 4, each
including twice as many trials, is 450. When the results are combined across sessions, the
analyses of strategy choices reported below are based on a total of 1350 data points, 270 for each
of the five games. Although both group membership and player roles were varied from trial to
trial, trials within sessions cannot be considered as statistically independent. Because players
realized that they might be matched with one or more players more than once, interdependencies
cannot be ruled out.
Game Outcomes. Table 1 lists the frequencies of the game outcomes across the four sessions by
game and cooperation structure. The modal cooperation structure in Games 1, 4, and 5 is
{A:B,A:C,B:C}, whereas the one in Games 2 and 3 is {A:B}. Non-minimal winning governments
formed 98, 52, 93, and 94 percent of the time for Games 1, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. The minimal
winning government formed 92 percent of the time for Game 2.
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Table 1. Frequencies of game outcomes by cooperation structure and game.
Frequencies of Strategy Choices. Across the three player roles and four sessions, undominated
strategies were chosen with relative frequencies of 0.911, 0.903, 0.944, 0.822, and 0.844 in
Games 1- 5, respectively. However, as mentioned earlier, the “sophisticated” players of Sessions
3 and 4 chose undominated strategies significantly more often than the “unsophisticated” players
of Sessions 1 and 2. The mean (and standard deviation) of these proportions were 0.83 (0.116)
for the unsophisticated players and 0.91 (0.047) for the sophisticated players.
Table 2 breaks down the frequency of strategy choices by player role and game. The
results are combined across the four sessions. For example, players of type A in Game 1 chose
strategies {B}, {C}, {B,C}, and {Æ}, 5, 1, 84, and 0 times, respectively. The frequencies of
undominated strategies appear in boldface. The right-hand column of Table 2 presents the
percentages of the choices that were undominated strategies across the four sessions. Table 2
shows that undominated strategies were chosen between 73.3% (player C in Game 2) and 100%
(player B in Game 3) of the time. In Games 1, 4, and 5, where each player had a single (weakly)
dominant strategy, these were chosen between 80% and 93.3% of the time. Although there was a
general tendency for each player to cooperate with the other two players, the players clearly
distinguished among the five games. Thus, the modal choice of player A in Game 2 was B (rather
than {B,C}), and the modal choice of player B in the same game was A (instead of {A,C}). The
third and second columns from the right display the results separately for the unsophisticated and
sophisticated players, respectively. With only two exceptions, the percentages of choice of
undominated strategies are higher for the latter than former players.
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Note:  Undominated strategies appear in boldface.
Table 2.  Frequency of strategy choices by player role and game.
Equilibrium Outcomes. Table 3 summarizes information about the predictive success of the
various solution concepts. Columns 1 and 2 report the frequency of Nash equilibrium and
potential maximizing strategy profiles for each game. From the data in columns 1 and 2 we can
compute how often potential maximization selects the correct Nash equilibrium in each game.
These numbers  are  reported  in  column 5.  In Games 1,  2,  4, and 5,  potential maximization  is
shown to select the correct Nash equilibrium 99, 100, 100 and 98 percent of the time. The
potential maximizing strategy profile consists of (weakly) dominant strategies in Games 1, 4, and
5, but no player has a dominant strategy in Game 2. In Game 3 the potential maximization
selects the correct Nash equilibrium only 27 percent of the time. While the percentage is
considerably lower in Game 3 than the other four games, it is worth noting that in Game 3 the
individual players A, B, and C played their unique, potential maximizing strategy 40, 46, and 70
percent of the time, respectively.
NE PotMax IEWDS SNE PotMax|NE SNE|NE
Game 1 68 67 67 -- 98.5% --
Game 2 83 83 65 83 100% 100%
Game 3 52 14 75 39 26.9% 75%
Game 4 51 51 51 -- 100% --
Game 5 53 52 52 -- 98.1% --
Table 3. Observed outcomes (across sessions).
Column 3 shows the number of times IEWDS strategy profiles were played in each
game. In each of Games 1, 4, and 5 Nash equilibria occurred that were not IEWDS less than 2
percent of the time. Nash equilibria that are not IEWDS occurred 21 percent of the time in Game
2. In Game 3, where neither solution set is a subset of the other, Nash equilibria occur 62 percent
of the time compared to 83 percent of the time for IEWDS. Deeper analysis of the data shows
that IEWDS profiles occur that are not Nash equilibria 29 times, while Nash equilibria occur that
are not IEWDS only 6 times.
Column 4 of Table 3 shows the number of times strong/coalition proof Nash equilibrium
(simply labeled SNE) strategy profiles were played in each game. Column 6 shows how often
refinement to SNE selects the correct Nash equilibrium in each game. The set of SNE is empty in
Games 1, 4, and 5. In Game 2, the set of SNE coincides with the set of potential maximizers and
hence picks the observed Nash equilibria the same number of times. In Game 3, the set of
strong/coalition proof Nash equilibria includes eight strategy profiles and does not include the
unique potential maximizer. SNE is correct 75 percent of the time, compared to 27 percent for
potential maximization.
Overall, and taking into account the differential predictability of the different solution
concepts (Table 1), there is strong support for potential maximization as a predictor of play in the
government formation game. Potential maximization does the same or better than IEWDS in four
of five games. As a refinement of Nash equilibrium it is equal to strong/coalition proofness in
Game 2 but worse in Game 3. It does very well as a refinement of Nash in Games 1, 4, and 5,
where the sets of SNE are empty. The support for potential maximization is significantly
stronger for sophisticated players. In Games 1, 2, 4, and 5 potential maximization selected the
Nash equilibrium played by sophisticated players 100 percent of the time. The percentage of
potential-maximizing Nash equilibria selected by sophisticated players in Game 3 (27 percent)
was the same as for the unsophisticated players.
In Game 1, all three players have the same policy position making it the only game that is
superadditive. There is a large body of work that predicts the formation of the grand coalition in
superadditive games.
5 Our experimental results for Game 1 are consistent with the findings of
those studies.
6.  Conclusion
We propose and experimentally test a model of government coalition formation that combines
information about the distribution of votes among the parties and their position on the policy
line. A major feature of the model is that it allows for the formation of either minimal winning or
non-minimal winning coalitions. A second major feature is that it treats the formation of a
coalition government as a non-cooperative (strategic) game. Consequently, various solution
concepts for games in strategic form may be applied and competitively tested.
                                                          
5 See, for example, Qin (1996), Slikker (2001), Slikker et al. (2000).
The experimental results support the main theoretical predictions of the paper that are
based on the premise that political parties select potential-maximizing Nash equilibria. The first
prediction is that a three-party government with full cooperation between parties will form
whenever the distance between policy positions of the parties is large relative to the value of
forming the government. We conducted four games of this sort; Games 1, 3, 4, and 5. The
theoretical predictions for Games 1, 4, and 5 are the same: cooperating with both of the others
players is a weakly dominant strategy for all three players, and everyone cooperating fully is
potential maximizing as well as being the only strategy profile that survives IEWDS. The only
difference between the three games is the degree of symmetry in the policy positions of the
parties. In Game 1, all three parties are the same; in Game 4, two are different; and in Game 5,
all three have different policy positions. These differences are reflected in the payoffs shown in
Appendix B. The occurrence of the potential maximizing outcome was high in all three of these
games: potential maximization performed very well as a refinement of Nash, being correct over
98 percent of the time in each case. This is despite the fact that in game 1 all graphs (but the one
with no links) yield the same total welfare and in games 4 and 5 the potential maximizing
solution does not maximize total welfare. There was no evidence that differences in the degree of
symmetry mattered in these games.
Full cooperation in Game 3 is predicted by potential maximization and is consistent with
IEWDS, but cooperating with both players is not a weakly dominant strategy for any of the
players. Moreover, the strategy profile that leads to full cooperation is neither strong nor
coalition proof. Here, potential maximization does poorly in terms of outcomes for the three-
player game; however, the data show that individuals played their potential maximizing strategy,
which is to cooperate with both of the other players 52 percent of the time (see Table 2). Hence,
non-minimal winning governments were still observed most often in Game 3 (see Table 1).
The second prediction is that in cases where the distance between policy positions of the
parties is small relative to the value of forming the government a minimal winning government
will form that includes the two parties closest together on the policy line. We conducted one
game of this sort, namely, Game 2. Here, potential maximization selected the observed strategy
profile over 90 percent of the time despite the fact that there are no dominant strategies; as a
refinement of Nash equilibrium potential maximization was perfect!
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.  First consider party A, and fix her strategy at {B,C}. In order for {B,C}
to be a weakly dominant strategy for party A, the strategy {B,C} must earn a payoff at least as
high as any other strategy for party A, regardless of the strategies played by the other two parties.
To show this we use the following notation. Given any graph g on N, let 
A
g
- P  ^
-A ³
B 
C :
g({B,C`
-A) = g} be the set of strategy pairs for B and C, which when combined with strategy
{B,C} for party A produce the graph g.
 6:KHQSOD\HGDJDLQVWWKHVWUDWHJ\SDLUVLQ
-A
 «, the
strategy {B,C} is at least as good as any other strategy for party A because in this case all  of
party A’s strategies earn her a payoff of zero. Assuming parties B and C play a strategy pair in
A
C B
- P } : { , {B,C} is at least as good as any other strategy for party A because, once again, all of
party A’s strategies earn her a payoff of zero.
Next, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for {B,C} to be at least as good as
any other strategy for party A, given that parties B and C play strategy pairs corresponding to the
remaining six graphs. We then show that given our specification of the characteristic function in
(1), these conditions are equivalent to those in Proposition 1.  To this end, consider the set
A
B A
- P } : { .  The only alternative that party A can achieve by unilateral deviation is to earn zero by
changing her strategy to one that breaks the link with party B. It follows from the specification of
the Myerson value that for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A, it is necessary and
sufficient that
½v({A,B})  0.
7                    (A.1)
                                                          
6 Note that we are using g(.) as a function mapping strategy profiles to graphs and g as a graph.
7 Note that to save space we suppress the parameters p and G in the characteristic function.
Likewise, the condition for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A against strategy pairs in the
set 
A
C A
- P } : {  is
½v({A,C})  0.                  (A.2)
Consider the set 
A
C B B A
- P } : , : { . In this case, the link between parties B and C remains regardless of
the strategies for party A. Consequently, party A’s only alternative is to earn zero by changing
her strategy to one that breaks the link with party B. Hence, in this case, for {B,C} to be weakly
dominant for party A, it is necessary and sufficient that
          1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                          (A.3)
Likewise, the condition for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party A against strategy pairs in
A
C B C A
- P } : , : {  is
                  1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,C})  0    (A.4)
Consider the set 
A
C A B A
- P } : , : { . Party A has three unilateral deviations that can change her payoff. She
can earn zero by choosing a strategy that breaks the links to both parties B and C, or she can
break the link to just one of them. If she breaks the link to party B and remains linked to party C,
she gets a payoff of ½v({A,C}).  If she breaks the link to party C and remains linked to party B
she gets a payoff of ½v({A,B}) . Hence, in this case, for {B,C} to be weakly dominant for party
A, it is necessary and sufficient that
                          1/3v(N) + 
1/6v({A,B}) + 
1/6v({A,C})  max{½v({A,C}), ½v({A,B}), 0}.         (A.5)
Finally, consider the set 
A
C B C A B A
- P } : , : , : { . Again, party A has three unilateral deviations that can
change her payoff. She can earn zero by choosing a strategy that breaks the links to both parties
B and C, or she can break the link to just one of them.  If she breaks the link to party B and
remains linked to party C she gets a payoff of 
1/3[v(N)–v({B,C})]+
1/6v({A,C}) (since parties B
and C are still linked).  By symmetry, if she breaks the link to party C and remains linked to
party B she gets a payoff of 
1/3[v(N)–v({B,C})]+
1/6v({A,B}). Hence, for {B,C} to  b e  we a k ly
dominant for party A against strategy pairs in 
A
C B C A B A
- P } : , : , : {  it is necessary and sufficient that
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6[v({A,B}) + v({A,C})] 
max{
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] +  
1/6v({A,B}), 
1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,C}),0}.  (A.6)
Conditions (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied automatically since we assume v(S)  0 for all S ² N.
For the same reason, the first two elements in the set on the right-hand-side of (A.6) are no
bigger than the left-hand-side.  Moreover, conditions (A.3) and (A.4) imply the third element is
no bigger than the left-hand-side. Hence (A.6) is satisfied.
The inequality is satisfied for the third element in the set on the right-hand-side of (A.5)
since we assume v(S)  0 for all S ² N.  The remaining conditions from (A.5) can be rewritten as
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                        (A.7)
and
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,B})] + 
1/6v({A,C})  0                                        (A.8)
Given the specification of the characteristic function is (1) and the assumption pA £ pB £ p C,
v({A,B}) = G – 0.5(pB - pA)
2, v({A,C}) = G – 0.5(pC - pA)
2, v({B,C}) = G – 0.5(pC - pB)
2, and v(N)
= G – (6(pB - pA)
2 + 6(pC - pB)
2 + 10(pB - pA)(pC - pB)/9. Thus, v({A,B})  v({A,C}) and hence
(A.4) implies (A.3). Likewise, we have v({B,C})  v({A,C}) and hence (A.3) implies (A.7).  The
remaining conditions, (A.4) and (A.8), are the ones stated in the proposition.
The same reasoning shows that (A.4) and (A.8) are also necessary and sufficient for
{A,B} to be a weakly dominant strategy for party C. We need to pay special attention to party B,
however, since party B is in the middle. For {A,C} to be a weakly dominant strategy for party B,
it is necessary and sufficient  that
½ v({A,B})  0,                                                       (A.9)
½ v({B,C})  0,                                                 (A.10)
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({B,C})  0,                                     (A.11)
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0,                                     (A.12)
              1/3[v(N) + 
1/6v({A,B}) + 
1/6v({B,C})  max{½v({B,C}), ½v({A,B}),0},            (A.13)
and
1/3[v(N) –v({A,C})] + 
1/6[v({A,B}) + v({B,C})] 
max {
1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({B,C}), 
1/3[v(N) – v({A,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B}),0}. (A.14)
Conditions (A.9) and (A.10) are satisfied since v(S)  0 for all S ² N. For the same reason, the
inequality is satisfied for the first two elements in the set on the right-hand-side of (A.14).
Moreover, conditions (A.11) and (A.12) imply the inequality is also satisfied for third element.
Hence, (A.14) is satisfied. The inequality is satisfied for the third element in the set on the right-
hand-side of (A.13) since v(S)  0 for all S ² N. The remaining conditions from (A.13) can be
rewritten as
          1/3[v(N) – v({B,C})] + 
1/6v({A,B})  0                                     (A.15)
and
          1/3[v(N) – v({A,B})] + 
1/6v({B,C})  0                                          (A.16)
Given the specification for the characteristic function in (1), we know that v({A,B})  v({A,C})
and hence (A.16) implies (A.11). Likewise, we know that v({B,C})  v({A,C}) and hence (A.15)
implies (A.12).  The remaining conditions (A.15) and (A.16) are stated in the proposition.  ó
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the specification of the characteristic function in (1) and since pA £
pB £ pC, fB(v( × ;p,G)) ³ fi(v( × ;p,G) for i = A,C. Hence, fi(v( × ;p,G)) ³ 0 for i = A,C implies
fB(v(× ;p,G)) ³ 0. Statement 1 then follows from Remark 3(ii) of Garratt and Qin (2003a).
Now consider statement 2 of Proposition 2. Suppose fi(v( × ;p,G)) < 0 for some i Î {A,C}
so that some two-party government forms. Since pA £ pB £ pC, it must be the case that either
parties A and B are closest together on the policy line or parties B and C are closest together. Due
to the obvious similarities we only prove the case where  ). ( ) ( B C A B p p p p - < -  For any two-
party coalition {i,j}, i,j Î N, the solution to the maximization problem in (1) is  . 2 / ) ( * j i p p y + =
Consequently, 
2 ) (
2
1
}) , ({ j i p p G j i v - - =  for any i,j  Î  N. It is immediate that
}, 2 : ) ( max{ }) , ({ = = S S v B A v  and hence by Remark 3(i) in Garratt and Qin (2003a) a two-
party government including parties A and B forms. ó
Appendix B
Cooperation structures and payoffs by game.
    Game 1
    Game 2
A
BC
  A
BC
A
BC
   A
BC
Payoff for A:  225
Payoff for B:  225
Payoff for C:
Payoff for A:  0
  Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  225
Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  225
  Payoff for A:   0
 Payoff for B:  225
 Payoff for C:  225
Payoff for A:    75
Payoff for B:  300
Payoff for C:   75
Payoff for A:    75
Payoff for B:    75
Payoff for C:  300
Payoff for A:  300
Payoff for B:    75
Payoff for C:    75
 Payoff for A:  150
 Payoff for B:  150
 Payoff for C:  150
A
B C
A
B C
A
B C
 A
B C
A
BC
  A
BC
A
BC
   A
BC
Payoff for A:  270
Payoff for B:  270
Payoff for C:    0
  Payoff for A:  0
  Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  90
Payoff for B:   0
Payoff for C:  90
  Payoff for A:   0
  Payoff for B:  90
  Payoff for C:  90
Payoff for A:     50
Payoff for B:   140
Payoff for C:  (130)
Payoff for A:  (10)
Payoff for B:  (10)
Payoff for C:   80
Payoff for A:   140
Payoff for B:     50
Payoff for C:  (130)
Payoff for A:    80
Payoff for B:    80
Payoff for C:  (100)
A
B C
A
B C
A
B C
 A
B C
    Game 3
    Game 4
A
BC
  A
BC
A
BC
   A
BC
Payoff for A:  270
3D\RIIIRU%
Payoff for C:    0
3D\RIIIRU$
   Payoff for B:  0
   Payoff for C:  0
Payoff for A:  180
3D\RIIIRU%
Payoff for C:  180
  Payoff for A:    0
  Payoff for B:  180
  Payoff for C:  180
Payoff for A:    70
Payoff for B:  250
Payoff for C:  (20)
Payoff for A:    40
Payoff for B:    40
Payoff for C:  220
Payoff for A:  250
Payoff for B:    70
Payoff for C:   (20)
 Payoff for A:  130
 Payoff for B:  130
Payoff for C:    40
A
B C
A
B C
A
B C
 A
B C
A
BC
  A
BC
A
BC
   A
BC
  Payoff for A:  198
  Payoff for B:  198
 Payoff for C:    0
3D\RIIIRU$
   Payoff for B:  0
  Payoff for C:  0
 Payoff for A:  162
 Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  162
  Payoff for A:   0
  Payoff for B:  162
  Payoff for C:  162
Payoff for A:   58
Payoff for B:  220
Payoff for C:   22
Payoff for A:    46
Payoff for B:    46
Payoff for C:  208
Payoff for A:  220
3D\RIIIRU%
Payoff for C:    22
 Payoff for A:  112
 Payoff for B:  112
Payoff for C:   76
A
B C
A
B C
A
B C
 A
B C
    Game 5
A
BC
  A
BC
A
BC
   A
BC
Payoff for A:  243
Payoff for B:  243
Payoff for C:    0
    Payoff for A:  0
   Payoff for B:  0
   Payoff for C:  0
 Payoff for A:  222
 Payoff for B:    0
Payoff for C:  222
3D\RIIIRU$
   Payoff for B:  267
   Payoff for C:  267
Payoff for A:    43
Payoff for B:  310
Payoff for C:   67
Payoff for A:    36
Payoff for B:    81
Payoff for C:  303
3D\RIIIRU$
Payoff for B:    73
Payoff for C:    52
   Payoff for A:  117
   Payoff for B:  162
   Payoff for C:  141
A
B C
A
B C
A
B C
 A
B C
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